Afghanistan’s growing belligerence
Publishing date: 11 November 2025
Published in: Business Recorder
Afghanistan’s ongoing instability remains a serious challenge not only for its people but also for its neighbours, particularly Pakistan.
The security situation along the shared border, defined by the Durand Line, continues to create an environment that affects Pakistan’s peace and economic stability. This boundary, established in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan, has long been a source of contention.
While Pakistan recognizes it as the international border, Afghanistan has never fully accepted it, viewing the Durand Line as a colonial remnant dividing the Pashtun ethnic groups across both nations. This unresolved issue still fuels tension and complicates relations between the two countries.
Militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operating from Afghan soil, have worsened the already fragile situation. Despite Pakistan’s consistent efforts to secure its borders and promote regional stability, Afghanistan’s inability or unwillingness to control these groups remains a major obstacle to peace.
At the same time, Pakistan’s pursuit of strategic economic projects faces severe risks due to this instability. One such project is the extraction of rare earth minerals in Balochistan, developed in partnership with the United States. These minerals are vital for industries such as electronics, renewable energy, and defense—sectors central to Pakistan’s long-term growth. However, Afghanistan’s failure to curb cross-border militancy threatens the security and viability of this project.
The TTP issue has been particularly damaging. The Afghan Taliban’s reluctance to act against these militants deepens distrust. Kabul argues that the TTP fighters are returnees from Pakistan who sought refuge during the Cold War and post-9/11 era. This claim is misleading. In reality, Pakistan hosted millions of Afghan refugees during those decades of conflict and facilitated their return when conditions improved. Pakistan’s later decision to repatriate refugees was driven by economic and security realities, not hostility. Much like the United Kingdom’s Brexit, where national interests prevailed, Pakistan acted to safeguard its sovereignty.
Meanwhile, the economic consequences of Afghanistan’s instability extend beyond Pakistan. China, which had once deeply invested in Afghanistan’s mining and infrastructure, has now scaled back after facing threats, harassment, and asset seizures by the Taliban regime. India, on the other hand, has used Afghanistan’s turmoil to limit Pakistan’s regional influence. By funding selective development projects and supporting certain Afghan factions, India has used instability as a strategic tool rather than promoting regional peace.
Pakistan’s patience has been repeatedly tested, especially after the recent martyrdom of eleven Pakistani soldiers in a cross-border attack by Afghan-based militants. In response, Pakistan carried out targeted airstrikes on TTP hideouts inside Afghanistan, sending a clear message that while diplomacy is preferred, sovereignty violations will not be tolerated.
Adding to these security concerns is the new water dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan. During recent peace talks in Istanbul, Afghanistan’s government announced its intent to construct a dam on the Chollar River, part of the larger Kunar River system. The Kunar River, originating from the Chyantar Glacier in Chitral, Pakistan, contributes a dominant share of Kabul River flow, roughly between 60 and 75 percent according to multiple hydrological studies. Any disruption could severely impact Pakistan’s agriculture and water security.
This development mirrors India’s involvement on the eastern front, as Afghanistan, supported by Indian technical expertise, pursues projects like the Afghan-India Friendship Dam. The Afghan Foreign Minister’s recent visit to India further advanced agreements on joint water and electricity initiatives. For Pakistan, this expansion of Indian influence on both its eastern and western borders is troubling.
To counter these moves, Pakistan has explored options such as redirecting water from the Chitral River to Swat—a technically feasible but financially demanding plan. However, both countries face fiscal constraints that limit their ability to implement such large-scale projects. Afghanistan’s use of shared river waters, currently 1.8 million acre-feet annually, is expected to double by 2030, potentially reducing Pakistan’s inflow by up to 5 percent. This would deal a heavy blow to Pakistan’s agrarian economy.
Beyond water, Afghanistan’s collaboration with India and its treatment of foreign investors, such as Chinese firms accused of underperformance and subjected to asset confiscation, demonstrates erratic governance. These actions undermine investor confidence and risk further isolating Afghanistan from the international community.
Internally, the Taliban-led regime continues to struggle for legitimacy. Its engagement in external disputes, such as water and border issues, seems aimed at rallying domestic support. Yet this approach risks backfiring, deepening both domestic discontent and regional instability.
Pakistan, therefore, must respond through a strategic approach that addresses both water-sharing and militancy together. These are not separate issues; they are deeply interconnected. Water security cannot be ensured without border security, and vice versa. Pakistan’s rights to its transboundary water sources must be asserted firmly while keeping diplomatic channels open.
Regional cooperation is vital. Multilateral mechanisms such as the Moscow Format, the Trilateral (China-Pakistan-Afghanistan), and the Quadrilateral (China-Pakistan-Russia-Iran) provide platforms to address terrorism, water governance, and economic integration collectively. These forums should be used more actively to de-escalate tensions and promote stability.
The stakes are high. Around 400 million people across Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan still live in poverty, many without access to education or basic healthcare. Each rise in regional tension diverts precious resources from human development to defense, perpetuating cycles of poverty and insecurity.
For Pakistan, success will depend on balancing security needs with development goals. The rare earth partnership with the United States offers an opportunity for economic transformation, but only if regional peace can be secured. Similarly, sustainable management of shared water resources with Afghanistan can turn a potential conflict into cooperation.
Ultimately, Afghanistan’s turmoil, India’s opportunism, and Pakistan’s vulnerabilities form an intricate triangle that will define South Asia’s stability in the coming decade. The path forward lies not in confrontation but in coordinated diplomacy and pragmatic policy.
Afghanistan must act responsibly by curbing militancy, respecting transboundary water rights, and creating a safe environment for investors. Pakistan, in turn, must continue using diplomatic forums to protect its security and economic interests. The move toward regional stability cannot be imported; it must be built locally, step by step, through understanding and respect for shared resources.
The real test of leadership in both countries will be measured not by rhetoric but by their ability to turn conflict into cooperation. The future of South Asia depends on how wisely both nations prepare the ground beneath their shared borders and rivers.